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Note
Blurring the Line Separating Church and
State: California Exposes the Inherent
Problems of Charitable Choice
Elizabeth Tobin*
When President George W. Bush entered office in January
2001, he began his efforts to assemble the "armies of compassion."' Shortly after taking his oath of office, President Bush
announced his plan to launch a faith-based initiative allowing
religious groups to receive federal funds to administer federal
programs. 2 While Congress debated the Charitable Choice Act
(CCA), a California appellate court ordered Catholic Charities
to provide its employees with prescription contraceptive coverage. 3 The court addressed a California statute enacted to
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
University of Minnesota. I would like to thank my mother, Patty, for an infinite number of things, but especially for her belief in me, and all my sisters,
for laughter, gossip, and good times. Special thanks to Professor Dale Carpenter, Andy Bednark, Heather McNeff, Christy Szitta, and Matt Wegner for all
their comments and help. For Rita.
1. See generally George W. Bush, Foreword to Rallying the Armies of
Compassion (Jan. 2001) (revealing a plan that would make religious groups
eligible to receive federal grants and provide a vast variety of government programs), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html.
2. The proposed legislation is called the Charitable Choice Act of 2001.
H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov. The
Community Solutions Act of 2001 also is part of House Bill 7 and focuses on
tax incentives to increase contributions to faith-based and nonprofit entities.
Id. §§ 101, 301-401.
3. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (not citable as
precedent in any California court). In September 2001, the California Supreme Court granted review of the Court of Appeal's decision. 31 P.3d 1271
(Cal. 2001). Due to the recent grant of review, the opinion accompanying
Catholic Charities cannot be cited as precedent in any California court. 31
P.3d at 1271. This Note, however, does not cite the opinion in CatholicCharities for precedential legal authority. Instead, the Note examines one court's
approach to a specific factual scenario. In Catholic Charities,the issue centers
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eliminate gender discriminatory insurance practices. 4 Although the statute contains a religious exemption, 5 the court
found that Catholic Charities did not meet the exemption's re6
quired elements.
The implications of the CCA and Catholic Charitiesof Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County are complex and far reaching.7 The lack of case law that specifically
on the exemption for religious employers and the statute that contains it,
which is similar to statutes of many other states. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183;
statutes cited infra note 47. The Note does not purport to affirm or denounce
the legal reasoning used by the court in reaching its conclusion-it merely examines the effect of these statutes on religious employers and the possible impact the CCA would have on statutes of this kind.
4. Women's Contraception Equity Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring employers who provide employees prescription drug coverage under insurance plans to extend insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives); see
also CatholicCharities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (discussing the legislative history of the Act).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196(d) (West Supp. 2002). If a religious employer is an entity
that meets the following four elements, it may request an insurance plan that
does not cover contraceptives if contraceptive use is contrary to its beliefs: (a)
the entity's purpose is the inculcation of religious values; (b) the entity hires
primarily those employees who share its religious beliefs; (c) the entity serves
primarily those individuals who share the religious beliefs of the entity; and
(d) the entity is a nonprofit organization pursuant to Section 6033(a)(2)(A)(i)
or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1367.25(b)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D)
(West Supp. 2002).
6. CatholicCharities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184. Although Catholic Charities is a nonprofit organization, it serves and employs people regardless of
their religious affiliation. Id. "Its employees, 74 percent of whom are not
Catholic, come from a diverse group of religious faiths." Id. Catholic Charities
does not proselytize or inculcate those it serves with Catholic doctrine. Id.
Furthermore, it offers general social services to the public at large. Id.
7. For example, two commentators have noted that after a religious
group in California receives federal funds under the CCA, the inculcation of
religious values will no longer be the primary purpose of the group and it
would serve people of all faiths. See John J. Miller & Ramesh Ponnuru, Faithless California, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at http'//www.nationalreview
.comldaily/nr070501.shtml (July 5, 2001). After receiving the funds, therefore,
this group could not meet the elements of the religious employer exemption
under the Women's Contraception Equity Act. See id. Another commentator
has observed that the charitable choice concept involves dangers that substantially outweigh the potential benefits. See Stuart Taylor Jr., SeparationAnxiety: Bush's Commendable Embrace of Faith Can Both Help and Harm Goternment and Religion, 24 LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2001, at 50. For example, the
CCA could create competition between religious organizations and secular
charities, make religious organizations dependent on the government, and
generally degrade the effectiveness of religious organizations and their reli-
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addresses the constitutionality of direct federal aid to noneducational religious institutions presents an additional difficulty in ascertaining the impact of the CCA.8 The faith-based
organizations that maintain paid employees and accept federal
aid under the CCA could be required to provide contraceptive
coverage pursuant to California's Women's Contraception Equity Act.9 The questions presented by the CCA and Catholic
Charities also involve issues of preemption and the religion
clauses of the First Amendment.1 0 Although recent developments make it unlikely that the CCA will pass under House
Bill 7,11 the CCA itself will almost certainly reemerge and degious character. Id.
8. See Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of
CharitableChoice, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 149, 167-68 (2000) (noting that the
American Jewish Congress and the Texas Civil Rights Project filed suit in
Texas state court, claiming that a charitable choice contract (under 42 U.S.C. §
604(a)) violates the state and federal constitutions); Carmen M. Guerricagoitia, Innovation Does Not Cure Constitutional Violation: Charitable Choice
and the Establishment Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 447, 448
(2001) (indicating that the American Jewish Congress and the Texas Civil
Right Project "have instituted constitutional challenges to this law in the
courts"); Jean-Paul Jassy & Jeffrey H. Blum, The FirstAmendment: Gore Versus Bush, 18 COMI. LAW., Fall 2000, at 1, 31 (noting that although many Supreme Court cases address governmental aid to parochial schools, few cases
analyze the provision of governmental fimds to non-educational religious organizations); Katherine A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious
Health Care Providers'Beliefs and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703,
1731 (1999) (explaining that most recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence
deals with aid to religious schools, which may present such a unique situation
that recent case law may not apply to federal aid for religiously sponsored social services providers).
9. See Miller & Ponnuru, supra note 7 (noting that the inability of religious employers to claim the exemption would result in requiring faith-based
groups to provide contraceptive coverage despite their objections); supra note 5
(discussing the content of the Women's Contraception Equity Act).
10. The First Amendment states in relevant part, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The doctrine of preemption arises from the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981).
11. On February 8, 2002, Sen. Joseph Lieberman addressed the United
States Senate regarding the introduction of a new bill. 148 CONG. REc. S546
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). Sen. Lieberman spoke
of the controversy surrounding the CCA in H.R. 7. Id. Due to that controversy, H.R. 7, although it passed the House, stalled in the Senate. Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State, White House Endorses 'Compromise' on Faith-Based Initiative with Sens. Lieberman, Santorum, at
http'J/www.au.org/press/pr020702.htm (Feb. 7, 2001). Democratic Sen. Lieberman and Republican Sen. Santorum drafted a compromise that allows religious organizations to receive federal funds, but lacks the controversial provi-
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bate will continue over its provisions.1 2
sions of the CCA. 148 CONG. REC. S546 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Lieberman). The new legislation is titled the Charity Aid, Recovery, and
Empowerment Act (CARE). S. 1924, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov. CARE does not include the expanded version of charitable choice embodied in the CCA. Id. § 301. CARE still allows religious organizations to be involved in the delivery of social service programs. Id. § 301(a).
It firther disallows any requirement that these organizations remove any religious art. Id. § 301(a)(1). This provision is identical to its CCA counterpart.
H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(e) (2001). The new legislation also states that no
religious organization shall be required to alter its charter or religious qualifications for governing board members. S. 1924 § 301(a)(2)-(3). Instead of containing an overt nondiscrimination provision, CARE simply requires equal
treatment for nongovernmental providers. Id. § 301(b). CARE defines a social
service program as one that "provides services directed at helping people in
need, reducing poverty, improving outcomes of low-income children, revitalizing low-income communities, and empowering low-income families and lowincome individuals to become self-sufficient." Id. § 301(e)(2)(A)(ii). Examples
of these programs include child care, protective services for children and
adults, foster care, adoption services, home management services, adult day
care, services for disabled individuals, transportation, job training, health
support, and mentoring services. Id. § 301(e)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(VU). CARE also allows religious organizations to provide programs for the prevention of juvenile
delinquency, substance abuse, and domestic violence, as well as assistance to
crime victims. Id. § 301(e)(2)(A)(ii)(VIII). In concluding his address to the
Senate, Sen. Lieberman stated that he was "pleased with this proposal, and
proud of the work we have done together to make it viable. In the end, the
Good Lord, not the devil, is in the details." 148 CONG. REC. S546 (daily ed.
Feb. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). Although CARE purports to present an uncontroversial alternative to the version of the CCA in H.R. 7, commentators argue that it presents constitutional concerns. Americans United
for the Separation of Church & State, supra. Rev. Barry W. Lynn, the executive director of Americans United, argues that CARE still provides special
treatment to religious groups. Id. Furthermore, although secular contractors
must maintain governing boards that reflect the diversity of the surrounding
community, CARE exempts religious organizations from this requirement. Id.
12. The sponsor of H.R. 7, Rep. J.C. Watts, did not exhibit enthusiasm for
the Senate's compromise measure, suggesting that CARE will require more
emphasis on faith to pass the House. Dana Milbank, Bush Endorses Compromise in Senate on Aid to Charities, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A4. Rep.
Watts further stated that once the Senate passes CARE, the House and Senate will work out their difficulties in order to place the "armies of compassion
in the field." Elisabeth Bumiller, Accord Reached on Charity Aid Bill After
Bush Gives in on Hiring,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A19 (quoting Rep. J.C.
Watts). An unidentified House Republican leadership aide opined that most
Republicans in the House would fight to save the CCA during conference
committee.
James Kuhnhenn, Bush Settles on a Charity Bill, PHA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 8, 2002, at A4. Sen. Rick Santorum, the Republican sponsor of
CARE, agrees with the House proposal on the concept of charitable choice in
the CCA and stated that there will be an opportunity to seek the passage of
the CCA later in the year with the reauthorization of welfare legislation. See
id. Additionally, a senior administration official, speaking on the condition of
anonymity, admitted that the White House still supports charitable choice,
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This Note will examine the implications of the CCA on
California's Women's Contraception Equity Act, the CCA's impact on religious organizations that receive federal funds to operate federal programs, and the constitutionality of the CCA in
general. Part I details the CCA, Catholic Charities, and California's Women's Contraception Equity Act. Part II discusses
the existing doctrine regarding monetary government involvement in religious areas, the impact of such involvement on the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, preemption, and deference to administrative agencies.
Part III discusses the obligations of religious employers, the
burden on an individual's free exercise of religion, the CCA's
advancement of religion, and the irreconcilability of California's
statute with the CCA. Finally, this Note concludes that the
CCA violates the religion clauses and that it creates considerable obstacles for states with laws requiring contraception coverage.
I. THE "ARMIES OF COMPASSION" ASSEMBLE FOR WAR
AGAINST GENDER EQUITY
A. BREAKING DOWN THE WALL: THE CHARITABLE CHOICE
CONCEPT

The premise of the CCA is not novel to the federal government or to President Bush. As Governor of Texas, Bush organized similar charitable choice programs, advocating for the introduction of religious organizations into the social services
field. 13 Bush also emphasized
the concept of charitable choice
14
in his presidential campaign.
Furthermore, a charitable choice act currently exists in

but wanted Congress to pass CARE quickly. Id. Although the future of the
CCA under H.R. 7 is unclear, the commentary in the wake of CARE's introduction is evidence that the ideas and provisions that comprise the CCA will
continue to arise in the debate over this legislation and future legislative efforts. For this reason, this Note will discuss the CCA in terms of the language
drafted in House Bill 7. Although the bill number may change and the section
numbers may be altered, the concept will remain intact.
13. Dokupil, supra note 8, at 150.
14. In his presidential campaign, Bush favored expanding charitable
choice to all federal programs that allow nongovernmental groups to use federal funds for providing services. Terry M. Neal, Bush Makes 'Faith-Based'
Help Key Issue in Run for President,WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1999, at A14; see
also Jassy & Blum, supra note 8, at 31.
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federal law. 15 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 allows states to contract with religious organizations to provide assistance to welfare beneficiaries. 16 The statute explicitly states that its
purpose is to
allow States to contract with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of
disbursement under any program described [within the statute] on
the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious
freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded
17
under such program.

PRWORA also provides additional safeguards to protect
the religious organizations receiving funds, as well as the beneficiaries seeking government-funded services from religious organizations.18 Even though these religious organizations receive federal funds to administer government programs, they
may still discriminate on the basis of religion in employment
decisions. 19
After § 604a passed, then-Senator John Ashcroft attempted
to expand the application of the charitable choice concept in the
"Charitable Choice Expansion Act."20 The bill attempted to apply the concept of charitable choice across the board to any legislation concerning social service and public health programs. 2 1
15. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. V 1999).
16. See id; see also Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 462 (noting that the
charitable choice provision is mostly absent from the legislative history of the
PRWORA and that its significance was overlooked because the PRWORA represented a massive overhaul of the welfare system).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b).
18. See id. § 604a(c) (barring states from discriminating against religious
fund applicants on the basis of their religious character); id. § 604a(d)(1) (providing that the religious organization will retain its independence from federal, state, and local governments, including the right to control the development and practice of its beliefs); id. § 604a(d)(2)(A), (B) (declaring that neither
the federal government nor the states shall require a religious organization to
alter its internal governance or to remove any religious symbols); id. §
604a(e)(1) (providing that if an individual eligible for assistance has objections
to the religious character of an organization, an alternative provider must be
made available within a reasonable period of time); § 604a(g) (prohibiting discrimination by religious organizations against any eligible individual on the
basis of that individual's religious belief or lack thereof).
19. Id. § 604a(f). The religious organizations still maintain their exemption from Title VII. See id.; Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 449-50.
20. S. 1113, 106th Cong. (1999), available at http'/thomas.loc.gov; Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 450.
21. See Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 450.
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Although Ashcroft's initial attempt failed to enlarge charitable
choice, the CCA represents a renewed mission of expansion,
causing a considerable amount of debate in both the public and
private sectors. 22
The new version of the CCA23 mirrors PRWORA in many
respects. 24 The most notable difference, however, is the immense breadth of the CCA's purpose. 25 The CCA facilitates the
entry of religious organizations into the social service regime
and allows them to maintain the integrity of their religious
character.26 To achieve that goal, the CCA prohibits the government from discriminating against those organizations. 27
The legislation also contains an immense expansion of the concept of charitable choice to a large number of government programs.28
22. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H3992 (daily ed. July 12, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Cummings) (arguing that the CCA will violate the separation of church
and state and force the government to choose one religion over another); Dana
Milbank & Thomas B. Edsall, FaithInitiative May Be Revised: Criticism Surprises Administration, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al (noting the Bush
administration's delay on the faith-based initiative due to the "surprisingly
vehement opposition to the program"); Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, An Open Letter to PresidentBush and Congressfrom America's Clergy (Apr. 24, 2001) (explaining the objections of various religious
groups to the faith-based initiative because of its entanglement with religion
and its ability to undermine the independence of religious practices), available
at http/www.au.org/cardlet.htm.
23. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
24. Id. § 201(c)(1)(B) (prohibiting discrimination by federal, state, and local governments against religious organizations that apply for federal grants);
id. § 201(d)(1) (allowing religious organizations to maintain their autonomy
from federal, state, and local government); id. § 201(d)(2)(A), (B) (prohibiting
federal, state, and local governments from interfering with the internal governance of the religious organization and from requiring the organization to
remove any religious symbols); id. § 201(e)(2) (allowing religious organizations
to maintain their Title VII exemption); id. § 201(g) (providing an alternative
for individuals who object to the religious character of the organization). For a
comparison of these provisions with PRWORA, see supra note 18.
25. H.R. 7 § 201(b)(1)(4).
26. Id. § 201(b)(2), (4).
27. Id. § 201(b)(2). Also included within the purposes of the CCA are the
efficient and effective delivery of assistance to eligible individuals and the protection of the religious freedom of those beneficiaries. Id. § 201(b)(1), (4).
28. Id. § 201(c)(4). Under section 201(c)(4)(A), the following programs are
covered by the CCA: the prevention and treatment ofjuvenile delinquency, the
improvement of the juvenile justice system, the prevention of crime, assistance
to crime victims, housing assistance, the prevention of domestic violence, and
hunger relief. Id. § 201(c)(4)(A)(i)-(viii). The same section also lists programs
that are funded under the following statutes: the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Housing and Community Development Act of
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The CCA contains numerous protections and prohibitions.
It expressly states that the funds received by religious organizations cannot be used to support the religion or the religious
beliefs or practices of such religious organizations. 29 The legislation further states that the receipt of government funds by religious organizations does not constitute a government endorsement of the religion or its beliefs. 30 In another attempt to
bolster its constitutionality, the CCA states that the religious
organizations receiving funds shall implement the programs in
a manner consistent with the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 31 Finally, the
CCA makes clear that the legislation does not affect the duties
of religious employers to comply with other anti-discrimination
laws.

32

In addition, the CCA addresses the accountability of these
religious organizations to the government. 33 At first glance, the
CCA does not treat religious groups any differently with regard
to accounting purposes compared to other nongovernmental or34
ganizations that receive federal funds to operate programs.
The funds used by religious organizations to implement government programs must be segregated in a separate account,
which may be audited by the government. 35 In addition to
1974, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, the Older Americans Act of 1965,
and the Federal Transit Act of 1998. Id. Section 201(c)(4)(B)(i) states that the
CCA covers programs that involve activities assisting students in obtaining
diplomas or their equivalents, and other after school programs. Id. §
201(c)(4)(B)(i). This CCA also includes programs under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Id. §
201(c)(4)(B)(i)(I), (H).
29. Id. § 201(c)(2).
30. Id. § 201(c)(3).
31. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A).
32. Id. § 201(e)(3). Although section 201(e) allows religious organizations
to maintain their exemption from Title VII's prohibition on discriminatory hiring on the basis of religion, that exemption is the only one explicitly listed. Id.
§ 201(e). The CCA provides under the same section that religious organizations must still comply with the other nondiscrimination provisions in Title
VII. Id. Under section 201(e)(3), religious organizations are required to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, and national origin), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (prohibiting discrimination in educational programs on the basis of sex and visual impairment), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (prohibiting discrimination against otherwise qualified disabled persons), and the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975. Id. § 201(e)(3).
33. Id. § 201(h).
34. Id. § 201(h)(1); see discussion infra Part III.B.
35. H.R. 7 § 201(h)(2). For purposes of the audit, the religious organiza-
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prohibiting the use of funds for religious beliefs, 36 the CCA also
proscribes the expenditure of funds for sectarian instruction,
worship, or proselytization. 37 Immediately after that restriction, however, the CCA states that "[if the religious organization offers such an activity, it shall be voluntary for the individuals receiving services and offered separate from the
program funded under [the statute] .,38
B. CALIFORNIA LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD
While Congress focused its attention on cultivating a relationship with religious organizations as potential social service
providers, California examined a woman's pressing need for
birth control. In 1999, the California legislature passed a remedial statute to eliminate gender discrimination in insurance
practices. 39 Although prescription drug benefits can be extensive, many plans do not cover contraceptives, requiring women
to pay up to sixty-three percent more in out-of-pocket costs
than men.40 Aside from the financial disparities, women risk
the ability to maintain social and economic equality if they are
unable to control their reproductive health.4 1 In response to
these findings, California passed the Women's Contraception
tion is to conduct a self-audit regarding its compliance with the relevant duties
and submit a copy to the appropriate agency, along with a plan to correct any
discrepancies identified in the self-audit. Id. § 201(i)(3).
36. Id. § 201(c)(2).
37. Id. § 201(i).
38. Id.
39. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp. 2002); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (not citable as precedent in any California court), reh'ggranted,31
P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001). The court found that the California legislature was entitled to follow the EEOC's decision and to find that excluding contraception
from prescription drug plans constituted gender discrimination. Catholic
Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187-88. The EEOC issued a decision declaring
that a failure to provide prescription contraceptive coverage under a prescription drug benefit plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and thus,
a violation of Title VII. EEOC, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION
(July 2, 2001), available at http'//www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.
html. The EEOC stated that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which
amended Title VII to cover adverse employment decisions based on pregnancy
as sex discrimination, included contraceptives because they are related to
pregnancy. Id.; see Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1994), amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1994).
40. Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
41. Id.
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Equity Act, which requires individual and group health insurance policies that provide prescription drug benefits to cover
prescription contraceptives. 42
The legislation provoked a response from Catholic groups,
which, according to their religious tenets, view contraception as
a sin and providing it through an insurance plan as facilitating
the commission of a sin. 43 In response, the legislature included
a narrow exemption for religious employers. 44 Although Catholic Charities operated as a religious organization, it served and
employed people of all faiths or no faith. 45 It therefore failed to
meet the requisite criteria for the exemption and therefore had
to provide insurance plans that included prescription contraceptive coverage. 46 The effort to provide contraceptive coverage, while reasonably accommodating religious groups, is not
unique to California; similar statutes exist in many other
states, though the religious exemptions vary.4 7
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1) (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196(a)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
43. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183. The Catholic groups requested that the Legislature place a "conscience clause" in the statute that
would allow religious groups to request plans that did not provide prescription
contraceptive coverage when doing so is contrary to the religious beliefs of that
group. Id.
44.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2000); CAL. INS.

10123.196(d) (West Supp. 2002). The exemption represented a compromise that allowed the state to pursue its legitimate interests while also accommodating the beliefs of various religions. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 183. For a list of the elements of the exemption, see supra note 5.
45. See Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184.
46. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196(d) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring that the entity primarily
employ and serve people sharing its faith); Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 184.
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503e(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001) (allowing religious employers, defined as a "qualified church-controlled organization," to request plans excluding coverage of prescription contraceptives if contraceptives are contrary to their religious beliefs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
3559(d) (2000) (providing an exemption for a religious employer whose bona
fide religious beliefs conflict with contraceptive coverage; providing no definition of "religious employer"); GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (2001) (missing an
exemption for religious employers and organizations); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10A-116.7 (Supp. 2001) (following closely California's exemption, except
requiring that the entity not be staffed by public employees and further stating that any educational, health care, or nonprofit owned or controlled by the
religious employer is exempted); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514C.19 (West Supp.
2001) (requiring group policies or contracts to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives and requiring that the person providing such policy comply
with the statute, but not mentioning a religious employer exemption); ME.
CODE §
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C. THE EEOC BREATHES NEW LIFE INTO A FAMILIAR DOCTRINE
In an article titled "Faithless California," 48 two commentators linked the religious exemption in the Women's Contraception Equity Act to the pending federal faith-based initiative and
saw an irresolvable tension between the two. 49 This article
identified the problematic impact of the CCA on the California
legislation and the statutes addressing contraception in other
states.50 Once religious institutions receive federal funds, they
will no longer primarily serve those of the same religion or in51
culcate religious beliefs.

REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756(2) (West 2000) (defining religious employer
as a "church, convention or association of churches or an elementary or secondary school that is controlled, operated or principally supported by a church or
by a convention or association of churches"); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)
(2001) (allowing an exemption for religious organizations whose bona fide religious beliefs conflict with providing contraceptive coverage; including no definition of "religious organization"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 689A.0417(5) (Michie 2001) (stating only that an insurer affiliated with a religious organization
is not required to provide the contraceptive coverage if there is an objection on
religious grounds); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-I (2000) (requiring insurers
(an undefined term) that issue blanket policies of accident or health insurance
to provide prescription contraceptive coverage, but not mentioning religious
employers or exemptions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-42(D) (Michie Supp.
2001) (stating only that a "religious entity" can elect to exclude prescription
drug coverage, without providing a definition of a religious entity); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-3-178(e) (1999) (providing an exemption for a religious employer,
which is defined as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization that has a primary
purpose of inculcating religious values and employs persons who share the
organization's religious beliefs); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-57(e) (2001) (providing
exemptions for religious employers, which are defined as churches or qualified
church-controlled organizations as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 3121); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (2001) (requiring health insurance plans that provide coverage for prescription drugs to include prescription contraceptive coverage, but
not including a religious employer exemption); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1
(Michie 1999) (providing that any insurers issuing individual or group insurance policies, corporations providing insurance contracts, and health maintenance organizations providing health care plans are required to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives if the plans cover prescription drugs, but
not containing an exemption for religious groups).
48. Miller & Ponnuru, supra note 7.
49. See id. (pointing out that the purpose of any charity receiving federal
funds under the CCA would no longer primarily be inculcating religious values
and therefore would not be eligible to claim an exemption); see also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE §
10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2002) (listing the elements of the religious
employer exemption).
50. For a list of states with similar statutes regarding contraception coverage and the religious exemptions that they contain, see supra note 47.
51. Miller & Ponnuru, supra note 7.
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The Women's Contraception Equity Act, along with many
of its counterparts in other states, addresses the discrimination
women face in insurance practices regarding their reproductive
health.52 The recent decisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and a recent district court case
out of Washington state53 further expanded a state's legitimate
social disparities in ininterest in eliminating the financial and
54
surance treatment of men and women.
The EEOC issued a decision during the summer of 2001
declaring that the failure to provide prescription contraceptive
coverage under insurance plans containing prescription drug
coverage violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).55 The PDA, enacted by Congress to require equal treatment of women affected
by childbirth and related conditions, 56 covers not only women
who are actually pregnant, but generally protects women's potential to become pregnant. 57 The EEOC concluded that contraception is a method by which women control their ability to
by
become pregnant, thus triggering the protections provided
58
the PDA because contraception is related to pregnancy.
The district court in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. adopted
the EEOC's decision.59 In Erickson, the federal court first faced
the question of whether the exclusion of prescription contraceptive coverage from a comprehensive prescription plan constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. 60 Although the court
61
noted that the PDA does not explicitly refer to contraception,
it found that failing to provide contraceptive coverage under
comprehensive insurance plans is inconsistent with the con52. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS.

CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp. 2002); Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
182 (exhibiting concern over gender discrimination in insurance practices); see
also supra text accompanying notes 39-42 (discussing the legislative purpose
of the Act).
53. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
EEOC, supra note 39.
54. See Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 (finding that the state
has a compelling interest in preserving public health and well-being).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); see EEOC, supra note 39.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
57. See id.; Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199,
211 (1991).
58. EEOC, supra note 39.
59. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275-76 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
60. Id. at 1268.
61. Id. at 1270.
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gressional intent evinced by the PDA. 62 The EEOC's decision,
its adoption in the state and federal system, and the contraception coverage statues in many other states represent a compelling and uniform trend in further eliminating gender discrimination in employment.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES
A. LOSING OUR RELIGION? THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."63 The Supreme Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence establishes the degree to which the government may
intrude upon citizens' religious practices.6 4 The standard used
to determine the point at which the infringement violates 65
the
Free Exercise clause varies throughout the Court's case law.
In one of its earliest Free Exercise cases, the Court recognized that Congress cannot pass laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion or punish individuals for their religious beliefs. 66 The Court, however, upheld the application of a law
prohibiting bigamy among Mormon settlers claiming a religious
duty to do so. 67 The Court distinguished the anti-bigamy law
as one that regulated conduct and not the exercise of one's religion. 6 8 If individuals could engage in otherwise unlawful conduct solely because of their religious beliefs, that religion's doc69
trines would reign superior over the law of the government.

62. Id. at 1270-71. "Even if one were to assume that Bartell's prescription
plan was not the result of intentional discrimination, the exclusion of womenonly benefits from a generally comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII." Id. at 1271-72.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[Tihe Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
government."); see also White, supra note 8, at 1725 (explaining that the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence established the boundaries
regarding the intrusion of a government regulation on individual religious
practices).
65.

White, supra note 8, at 1725.

66. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
67. Id. at 166.
68. See id. (explaining that although the government may not interfere
with religious opinions and beliefs, it can constitutionally regulate practices).
69. Id. at 167.
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In a later Free Exercise case, Lee, an Amish individual and
the defendant, challenged the constitutionality of the requirement that he pay social security taxes because he objected to
the payment on religious grounds.70 In addressing Lee's claim,
the Court developed a three-part Free Exercise inquiry: (1)
whether the government action interferes with the claimant's
free exercise rights,7 1 (2) whether the accomplishment of an
overriding government interest necessarily requires the burden
imposed on the individual,7 2 and (3) whether the accommodation of the individual's religious belief unduly interferes with
the fulfillment of the government's interest. 73 Although the
Court emphasized the need for Congress and the courts to be
sensitive toward the religious beliefs of individuals, it recognized that some burdens would inevitably exist. 74
When laws directly target religion or involve a direct burden on religion, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review. 75 Sherbert v. Verner involved the denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to a woman who would not work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs. 7 6 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, found that the woman's religious practices
were burdened because the law effectively forced her to choose
between religion and work. 77 The government could not impose

70. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982). Congress provided an
exemption to self-employed individuals who objected to the payment of social
security taxes and the receipt of public welfare benefits, but Lee did not fall
within the exemption. See id. at 255-56.
71. Id. at 256-57. The Court did not dispute that the payment of the taxes
violated Lee's religious beliefs and therefore burdened his free exercise rights.
Id. The Court noted that although a government action may burden an individual's free exercise rights, not all burdens are unconstitutional. Id.
72. Id. The maintenance of a regulated social security and tax system in
the United States clearly represented a valid governmental interest. Id. at
258.
73. Id. at 259. Allowing an exemption for religious beliefs in the area of
taxation would prove extremely difficult due to the extensive number of diverse religious beliefs in the country. Id. Although a religious accommodation
is possible in most cases, there are times when providing that accommodation
will restrict the ability of the legislature. Id. at 259-60.
74. Id. at 261 ("Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs
flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded
from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice
religious beliefs.").
75. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 886 n.3 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
76. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401-02.
77. Id.
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such a choice because it appeared as though the government
7
was punishing the individual for her religious beliefs. 8

The Court again modified its Free Exercise inquiry in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith. The Court determined that an individual's religious
beliefs do not excuse him from obeying the valid laws of the
government. 79 The Court thus found that neutral and generally applicable laws receive strict scrutiny only when they infringe upon multiple constitutional rights. 80 The Court also
concluded that the Free Exercise Clause does not require a religious exemption in laws that place an incidental burden on
religion. 8 1 Since the law placed only an incidental burden on
religious practices, the Court examined it under a relaxed level
of scrutiny and gave considerable deference to state interests in
82
drafting neutral laws of general applicability.

B. RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
While the Free Exercise Clause delineates the baseline

78. Id.
79. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 885 (finding that if a general and neutral
law's incidental impact on religion was sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, individuals could condition their recognition of the law upon their religious beliefs, thus elevating an individual's religion above the law of the land). The
state law at issue in Smith was a neutral law of general applicability that
regulated criminal conduct. Id. at 877-78.
80. Id. at 881. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's hasty disposal of the respondents' argument for application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 897
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She felt that relief under a free exercise claim was
appropriate whether the government imposed the burden directly, through
laws that specifically target religion, or "indirectly[,] through laws that...
make abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs
of others the price of an equal place in the civil community." Id.; see also
White, supra note 8, at 1727 (noting that since the Court found strict scrutiny
appropriate only when multiple constitutional rights were at issue, burdens on
religious exercise will not receive strict scrutiny unless they amount to "deliberate political persecution").
81. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court emphasized that a nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption was not required because the political process would aid those individuals whose religious beliefs were burdened. Id. But cf White, supra note 8, at 1730 (asserting that legislative exemptions that specifically apply to religious organizations are probably
unconstitutional).
82. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found
that a burden on religion that is an incidental effect of valid law does not offend the First Amendment. Id. Scalia noted, however, that the Court will still
"strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion." Id. at 886
n.3.
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that Congress must maintain to accommodate individual religious beliefs, the Establishment Clause erects a ceiling on the
government's involvement in religion. 83 Establishment Clause
jurisprudence does not yield a clear formula for addressing
laws that excessively entangle government with religious practices.8 4 Although state and federal funding of religious institutions permeates many areas, the Court has addressed the constitutionality of direct aid to non-educational religious
85
institutions only twice.
In one of its earliest Establishment Clause cases, the Court
addressed the payment of federal funds to support a religious
hospital. 86 The Court focused on the nature of the hospital as a
corporation, instead of as a religious hospital. 87 Although the
individuals who represented the corporation all belonged to a
particular religion and thus exerted some influence, that factor
did not convert a secular corporation into a religious one. 88
Therefore, the Court's decision emphasized a neutral application of law to corporations, regardless of their religious charac89
ter.
The issue of allocating federal funds to religious institutions arose again nearly one hundred years later in Bowen v.
Kendrick.90 The federal statute, the Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA), provided grants to religious and other organizations to
83. See White, supra note 8, at 1729.
84. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) ("The case's tortuous
history over the next 15 years indicates well the degree to which our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless
retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle.").
85. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which provided federal grants to religious institutions to curtail teenage sexuality); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291,
297-98 (1899) (holding that federal funding of a religious hospital did not violate the Establishment Clause); see also Dokupil, supra note 8, at 176-82 (examining the Court's reasoning in both cases and the implications of the decisions upon the concept of charitable choice).
86. Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 292.
87. See id. at 296-97 (noting that the hospital's incorporation documents
characterize the hospital as a corporation and do not refer to the religious beliefs of those in charge of the hospital).
88. Id. at 298.
89. See Dokupil, supra note 8, at 177-78. Although the Court did not
delve into an examination of the potential religious practices of an institution,
the decision left open the possibility that a religious corporation could alter its
charter just enough to continue to receive federal funding without implicating
Establishment Clause concerns. Id. at 178.
90. 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988).
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develop programs and conduct research in the area of adolescent sexuality.91 The congressional purpose behind AFLA, according to the Court, was primarily secular. 92 The appellees
argued that AFLA was unconstitutional on its face because it
expressly recognized the role of religion in problems of teenage
sexuality. 93 In addition, they asserted that impermissible religious inculcation would result because the religious groups directly received federal funds. 94 The Court, however, noted that
the Establishment Clause does not forbid Congress from utiliz95
ing religious groups to fight secular problems.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court announced a test to determine when laws violate the Establishment Clause. 96 When
examining a challenged law, the Court must find that (1) the
statute has a secular purpose, (2) the primary effect of the legislation does not advance or inhibit religion, 97 and (3) it will not
98
create unnecessary governmental entanglement with religion.
The particular "evils" that the Court hoped the test would root
out were sponsorship, financial support, and active state or
federal involvement in religion. 99
The Court modified the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton.1 0
91. Id. Congress passed AFLA in response to the significant social, economic, and public health consequences of early sexual activity and childbirth
among adolescents. Id. The grant recipients were to use the federal funds to
provide care and prevention services. Id. at 594. The Court assumed that
AFLA services provided by grant recipients were not religious in character.
Id. at 604-05. The section it cited for this proposition, however, contains no
such provision. Id. at 594 n.2.
92. Id. at 602. Fighting teenage sexual activity and providing for the expansion of services to help win that war represented legitimate, secular interests of government that did not implicate religious beliefs. Id. at 602-04.
93. Id. at 605-06.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 607. In upholding the constitutionality of AFLA, the Court relied on several factors. First, AFLA made grants available neutrally to a wide
variety of organizations. Id. at 608. Second, the Court found nothing to indicate that a significant amount of the AFLA funds would go to pervasively sectarian institutions. Id. at 610. Third, grant applicants were required to submit proposals detailing the proposed services and the manner in which they
would be provided. Id. at 615. Fourth, the grant recipients were subject to
evaluations and had to submit reports on the use of funds. Id.
96. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
97. Id.; see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117, 125-26
(1982) (vesting substantial discretionary government authority in religious
institutions had the primary effect of advancing religion).
98. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
99. Id. at 612 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
100. 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997). The Court continued to look for a secular
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In determining whether a government action results in the advancement of religion, the Court developed a three-part inquiry. First, the Court determines whether religious indoctrination can be attributed to a government action by focusing on
the principles of neutrality and private choice. 10 1 Second, the
Court asks if the program identifies its beneficiaries by reference to religion. 10 2 Third, in conducting the excessive entanglement portion of the inquiry, the Court evaluates the character and purpose of the institutions benefited, the nature of the
aid, and the relationship that results
between the government
03
and the religious organization.1
Cases examining government aid to private schools occupy
a large portion of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
the reasoning is applicable to government funding of noneducational religious organizations receiving direct aid. 104 The
principle of neutrality controls the inquiry of determining
whether religious indoctrination is attributable to the government. 10 5 In Agostini, the Court applied the modified test in a
government purpose but changed its inquiry regarding the effect of the government action. Id. at 233. This change combined the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test and treated entanglement as part of the inquiry into
the statute's effect. Id.; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000)
(stating that the Court clarified the appropriate test under the Establishment
Clause in Agostini).
101. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (viewing the principle of private
choice as a means of assuring neutrality); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223, 225-26,
230.
102. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31. In determining this portion of the inquiry, the Court examines the factors used by the program to identify beneficiaries to see if they create a financial incentive for religious indoctrination. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
103. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. The Court did not address this portion of
the inquiry in Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 808.
104. The Court's most recent Establishment Clause case involved the disbursement of federal funds to state and local agencies using the funds to lend
educational materials and equipment to public and private schools. Mitchell,
530 U.S. at 801. The program required the agencies to equally distribute
equipment and materials to both public and private schools. Id. The program
also required that the materials and services provided must be secular and
neutral in character. Id. Furthermore, the private schools never acquired
control over the funds or materials lent to them through the funds. Id. at 80203. The issue was whether the religious indoctrination occurring in the private schools that received federal funds could be attributed to the government.
Id. at 809.
105. Id. at 809-10. If the program furthers a legitimate secular purpose
and neutrally allocates aid, without reference to religion, to those who can further that purpose, the only effect of the aid going to religious organizations is
the furtherance of the secular purpose. Id. at 810; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230.
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school case and upheld a federal program that sent public
school teachers into private schools
to provide remedial educa10 6
tion for disadvantaged children.
The effect of the program did not advance religion through
indoctrination because the program disbursed aid to public
agencies, who then neutrally allocated those funds regardless
of the religious character of the school. 10 7 The program did not
determine its beneficiaries based on religion because the criteria centered on eligibility and need of individual children. 0 8
Finally, the program did not create an excessive entanglement
because it distributed aid neutrally and contained sufficient
protections to detect any religious inculcation.10 9 Therefore, the
program's effect did not advance religion. 1 0

C. AVOIDING A COLLISION: WHEN IS PREEMPTION
APPROPRIATE?

Although a law may survive the inquiries under the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the doctrine of preemption, which is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, 1 can present a
law with another hurdle. When a federal law and a state law
exist in a related field or create a conflict in their application,
preemption can apply.
First, Congress can explicitly state the amount of state law

Related to this principle is the importance of private choice. Mitchell, 530 U.S.
at 810; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226. Neutrality is assured when federal funds
that aid religious institutions do so because private individuals made private
choices to benefit those institutions. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810. The danger
that the government will exhibit preferences in an aid program is reduced
when a series of independent choices by private individuals determine the
amount of the benefit received by religious institutions. Id.
106. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208. The government program at issue had the
secular purpose of providing remedial education to all children in need, regardless of where they attended school. 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(1)(A), (F) (2000);
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-19.
107. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226, 228-29.
108. Id. at 209, 232.
109. Id. at 232, 234.

110. Id.
111. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981). The intent of Congress represents the most important consideration in
any preemption inquiry. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
284(1987).

1648

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.86:1629

that it intends to preempt under the applicable statute. 112 Second, although no express language delineates the area of state
law preempted, if the federal government evinces intent to occupy an entire area of regulation, the state then is preempted
from any regulatory efforts in that area. 113 Third, in the absence of express language and a total regulatory displacement,
the state law still is preempted if it conflicts with the federal
law. 114 A conflict that necessitates preemption occurs when
15
complying with both the federal and state law is impossible.
Another conflict arises where the congressional purposes of the
law are frustrated, such that an immovable obstacle is cre116
ated.
In determining whether federal law preempts state law
117
and to what degree, a court inquires on a case-by-case basis.
Generally, in the absence of language of congressional intent,
the court looks for an inherent conflict between state and federal law. 118 In examining an alleged conflict, the court looks to
the intent of Congress and its purpose and objectives included
in the law. 119
The Supreme Court addressed preemption issues related to
Title VII and the PDA120 in CaliforniaFederal Savings & Loan
21 The petitioners claimed that Title VII preAss'n v. Guerra.1
empted the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), a California statue that provided preferential treatment for pregnant

112. Cal. Fed.Say. & LoanAss'n., 479 U.S. at 280.
113. Id. at 280-81.

114. Id. at 281.
115. Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)).
116. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
117. See, e.g., id. at 249-56 (discussing the various facts of the regulation at
issue, the legislative history, congressional intent, and the likelihood of compliance with both laws). The Court assumes, at first, that Congress did not
intend to displace state law. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
Furthermore, if the states traditionally occupy the field that Congress allegedly preempts, the Court also assumes that Congress, in the absence of a clear
expression of intent, does not supercede the traditional police powers of the
state. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (citing Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
118.

See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281 (examining the stat-

utes for impossibility or frustration of congressional purpose).
119. Id. at 280-81.
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000),
amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k) (2000).
121. 479 U.S. at 274-75.
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employees. 122 The Court proceeded under the conflict analysis
because Congress explicitly disclaimed intent to completely
preempt state law or occupy the field of employment discrimination law, thus allowing states to enact additional remedial
legislation.12 3 The Court rejected the petitioners' claim because
Title VII and FEHA shared a common goal and FEHA did not
require the commission of a wrongful act to effect compli124
ance.
D. TAKING THEM SERIOUSLY: DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES

When courts are faced with challenges to the existence and
application of a law, an agency interpretation can provide them
with guidance. When an agency obtains congressional authorization to administer and interpret a statute, those interpretations generally receive deference. 125 If a party challenges an
agency's interpretation of a statute, the court proceeds in one of

two ways. 126 First, if Congress spoke directly to the issue and it
manifested a clear intent, courts and agencies must give effect
to that expressed intent. 2 7 In the absence of such expressed
intent, the court must determine if the interpretation is permissible. 2 8 In the case of an agency expressly assigned responsibility for a particular statute's interpretation, courts should
accord substantial weight to those interpretations. 2 9
122. Id. at 274-76. The California law at issue, the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), required employers to reinstate an employee after an
unpaid leave period in the same job unless a business necessity rendered the
job unavailable. Id. at 275-76. The petitioners claimed that the language of
the PDA rejected any state approach that provided preferential treatment to
pregnancy discrimination. Id. at 284.
123. Id. at 281 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, h-4).
124. Id. at 288, 292. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, agreeing with
the Ninth Circuit, found that Congress intended the PDA to serve as a floor,
not as a ceiling limiting benefits. Id. at 285 (citing Guerra v. Cal. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
125. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
126. Id. at 842.
127. Id. at 842-43.
128. Id. at 843. The Court found it improper for courts to impose their own
construction on an issue that an agency has interpreted. Id.
129. Id. at 844. In Chevron, a challenge arose against the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 840. The Court found that the ruling issued
by the EPA "gave primary emphasis to the rapid attainment of the statute's
environmental goals." Id. at 848. The Court further noted that when a challenge to an agency's interpretation essentially rests on criticism of the
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Congress vested the EEOC with enforcement responsibility
under Title VII. 130 Because the EEOC enforces Title VII, its interpretations of Title VII's various provisions should receive
great deference. 131 When Title VII and its legislative history
support the EEOC's interpretations, those interpretations are
viewed as likely expressing the will of Congress. 132 Therefore,
the EEOC's decisions on the proper application of Title VII and
its amendments, such as the PDA, carry significant weight.
III. A TORTURED MAZE AND THE CCA'S BLEAK FUTURE
Although the United States House of Representatives included various provisions in the CCA in an attempt to assure
its constitutionality, 133 the expansion of charitable choice to all
federal aid programs cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.1 34 The concept of charitable choice currently exists under
federal law,1 35 but the CCA represents a substantial expansion
of the concept to most federal aid programs that delegate funds
to nongovernmental organizations.1 36 This expansion imposes
too great a burden on individuals and thus violates the Free
Exercise Clause. 137 Likewise, the Establishment Clause is violated because the effect of the CCA advances religion. 13 8 Furagency's wisdom, instead of whether the interpretation is reasonable, the challenge must fail. Id. at 866.
130. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1994); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
131. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
132. See id. at 434.
133. See H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(c)(1)-(3), (d)(1)-(2), (e), (g) (2001). For a
discussion of these statutory sections and their contents, see supra notes 2527, 29-32, 37-38 and accompanying text.
134. See generally Dokupil, supra note 8, at 204 (finding that the narrower
charitable choice concept under PRWORA exhibits major weaknesses because
it lacks private choice and aid flows directly to religious organizations, therefore violating the Establishment Clause); Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 472
(concluding that charitable choice under PRWORA violates the three Establishment Clause principles of secular purpose, coercion, and endorsement);
Evan P. Schultz, God Save the Court-FromBush!, 24 LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5,
2001, at 51 (declaring that President Bush's faith-based initiative, which the
CCA is based on, "will end up in the courts").
135. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (listing PRWORA statutory sections and detailing its concept of charitable choice).
136. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(1)-(5) (listing the five stated purposes of the CCA);
id. § 201(c)(4) (listing the possible programs that fund recipients could administer); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.
138. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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thermore, although the CCA does not preempt the state laws
concerning contraceptive coverage, 39 its enforcement renews
and increases the difficulties faced by the CCA.
A. AN ASSAULT ON RELIGIOUS CHOICES

Under the CCA, religious organizations can compete with
other private, non-profit organizations for the receipt of federal
funds to administer federal programs. 140 As a result, religious
41
service providers could dominate some areas and programs.
The CCA contains a provision requiring the availability of an
alternative for an individual who objects to the religious character of the organization. 142 Although the CCA intends to protect individuals, it places the burden on the individual to come
forward with the objection. The Free Exercise Clause operates
as a restriction on the degree of governmental intrusion into an
individual's religious beliefs. 143 Therefore, creating a predominantly religious regime of social service providers surpasses the
permissible degree of intrusion. 144
Unlike the law at issue in Smith, the CCA is not a neutral
law of general applicability. 145 Instead, the CCA specifically allocates program funds to religious groups and instills an expec139. Congress does not explicitly state in the CCA that it intends to preempt any state law. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
280 (1987). Congress disclaimed all intent to preempt state law or occupy the
field in the area of employment discrimination law. Id. at 281. Finally, it is
possible to comply with both the CCA and those state laws that require contraceptive coverage. Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.C.
140. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2), (c)(2).
141. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 50-51 (arguing that even if the CCA required the existence of a secular counterpart for every religious organization
who receives a federal grant, "truly equivalent alternatives would not always-or even often-be available," because there is no guarantee that the
secular program would always be operational or effective).
142. H.R. 7 § 201(g).
143. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Free Exercise Clause addresses what the government
cannot do to the individual).
144. If the Free Exercise Clause establishes the degree to which government may interfere with individual religious practices, one can infer that a
social service regime featuring increasing numbers of religious providers
represents an impermissible degree of intrusion. Id.; see also H.R. 7 §
201(b)(2) (listing one of the purposes of the CCA as facilitating the entry of religious organizations into the existing social service regime).
145. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877-88 (1990) (finding a criminal law to be a neutral law of general applicability); see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (applying strict scrutiny to laws that directly
target religion).
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tation that religious organizations will be on equal footing with
other providers. 146 On one hand, administrators of the funds
must seek out religious institutions for the receipt of these
funds to carry out the CCA's purpose. 147 On the other hand,
the administrators must turn a blind eye to the religious character of the organization to avoid any appearance of discrimination. 14 8 The CCA, however, directs its anti-discrimination provision only to religious institutions. 149 The conundrum created
by the interaction between the CCA's purpose and the antidiscrimination provision results in a scheme where there is a
rapid rise of religious institutions in the social service regime. 150
146. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2) (expressing a desire to increase the presence of
religious organizations in the social service regime); id. § 201(c)(1)(B) (prohibiting fund administrators from deciding againstan organization because of its
religious character). These two sections combined create an expectation of
equal footing for religious organizations in light of the statute's purpose to increase the presence of these groups.
147. See id. § 201(b)(2) (maintaining that one of the primary goals of the
CCA is to facilitate the entry of religious organizations into the social service
regime).
148. See id. § 201(c)(1)(B). The prohibition on discrimination, in addition to
the goal of increasing religious organizations in the social service regime, creates a situation where administrators are first told to pay careful attention to
a group's religious character and at the same time to ignore it.
149. Id. The CCA states that neither federal, state, nor local governments
"shall discriminate against an organization that provides assistance under, or
applies to provide assistance under, such program on the basis that the organization is religious or has a religious nature." Id. (emphasis added). The
CCA does not contain a similar provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a protected class against secular applicants.
150. Furthering the CCA's purpose is made substantially easier by doubling the burden on officials choosing applicants to receive funds. These officials are not only charged with fulfilling the purpose of the CCA, but also with
ensuring that no organization is denied funding because of its religious character. See id. § 201(b)(2), (c)(1)(B). One commentator has created a hypothetical situation involving this claim. Taylor, supra note 7, at 51. When President Bush initially unveiled his faith-based initiative, it was thought that for
every religious organization that received a federal grant, a secular counterpart would also. Id. Although this would appear to provide continually a
secular alternative for beneficiaries, it would not guarantee that a "truly
equivalent" program would always be available. Id. The hypothetical, created
without incorporating the CCA's requirement that the programs be implemented in a manner consistent with the religion clauses, pictured two drug
treatment programs-one secular and one religious. Id.; see also H.R. 7 §
201(c)(1)(A). If the secular program, operating as the religious organization's
counterpart, shut down, the religious organization would lose its funding
unless it removed the religious character from the program. Taylor, supra
note 7, at 51. When the provisions of the CCA amend the hypothetical, individuals are left only with a religious organization providing a program that
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The government does not regulate or target religious practices under the CCA. 151 The effect of the law, however, places a
substantial burden on individuals in need of services that CCA
program providers offer. Although Smith indicates that most
Free Exercise claims will receive relaxed scrutiny under which
the state is accorded considerable deference, 152 the Court did
not overrule Sherbert.153 When an individual can show a classification based on religion that places a significant burden 1on54
her religious practices, strict scrutiny is still appropriate.
Under the CCA, the government does not explicitly place a
burden on the religious practices of potential program beneficiaries. 55 Nonetheless, the CCA makes a classification based on
religion by targeting religious organizations and thereby impos56
ing a burden.
The effect of the CCA, therefore, results in a substantial
burden on the beliefs or non-beliefs of individuals who are eligible for the government programs at issue. For example, major Christian organizations likely will receive the majority of
the federal funds because they have access to a large amount of
supposedly does not violate the religion clauses, while religious art and images
hang on the walls and clergy proselytize beneficiaries a few feet from the door.
See id.; discussion infra Part Ill.B (noting that the lack of monitoring makes it
impossible to insure that religious organizations are complying with the CCA's
requirement that the program be consistent with the religion clauses); see also
H.R. 7 § 201(j) (allowing proselytization so long as it is voluntary on the part of
the individuals and conducted separately from the federally funded program).
151. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (noting that
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion or punish individuals for their
beliefs cannot survive under the Free Exercise Clause); H.R. 7 § 201(d)(1),
(2)(A) (upholding the autonomy of religious groups and forbidding government
interference with the organization's internal governance); id. § 201(g) (requiring the availability of an alternative provider for an individual who objects to
the religious character of the social service provider); supra text accompanying
notes 66-69.
152. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878 (1990).
153. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (explaining that although neutral and
generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion do not warrant
strict scrutiny, classifications based on religion are subject to strict scrutiny).
154. Id.
155. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(5) (listing one of the purposes of the law as the
protection of individuals' religious freedom).
156. See id. § 201(b)(2) (encouraging the increased presence of religious organizations in the social service regime is an express purpose of the law); id. §
201(b)(3) (allowing religious organizations to provide services without impairing the religious character of the group); id. § 201(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)-(B) (including
special safeguards to protect the autonomy, internal governance, and religious
displays of organizations that receive funds).
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resources not readily available to other religious groups.
These Christian religions would provide a program that many
individuals may object to due to their different, contrary, or
lack of religious beliefs. Although the CCA provides that objectors can receive the services from an alternative provider, 158 the
burden rests on the individual to raise that objection.159 The
safeguard seems reasonable on paper, but the CCA does not
provide guidance as to whom the individual makes the complaint, how to locate the alternative provider, or what the indi1 60
vidual must do in the interim.

157. Before many religious organizations could provide a federal program,
they would need to consider overhead costs, such as maintenance costs for the
area where the program is provided and salaries for clergy members devoting
time to the program. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 50. Even before the CCA's
provisions entered the debate, critics and supporters stressed that the initiative should only allow the withdrawal of funds for direct program costs and
not overhead. Id. at 51. The CCA clearly states that the federal funds cannot
be used to support the religion or religious beliefs or practices of the religious
organization. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(2). Furthermore, these funds cannot be used for
proselytization or sectarian instruction and worship. Id. § 201(j). Therefore,
because all overhead costs must be accounted for prior to receiving fumds
(which can only be used for direct program costs) minority religious sects with
considerably smaller congregations may not have the available resources and
therefore could not apply for funds. See also Dokupil, supra note 8, at 198
(finding that large religions with more resources will get most of the funding
because the government views them as representing the "general consensus on
morality or ethics").
158. H.R. 7 § 201(g).
159. The objection provision in the CCA requires an alternative program be
made available for individuals who object to the religious character of an organization. Id. Under this language, the government forces an individual into
one of several impermissible positions. First, an individual would likely need
to state his own religious beliefs in explaining why he objects to the religious
character of the organization. Second, an individual who did not wish to share
his religious beliefs would either have to attempt to explain his objection on
non-religious grounds or forego the opportunity for an alternative, secular provider. The individual would likely be forced into the latter because the CCA
allows the request for an alternative when the individual "has an objection to
the religious character of the organization." H.R. 7 § 201(g)(1). Third, if it is
insufficient to claim an objection to the organization's religious character
without stating why it conflicts with an individual's religious beliefs, the individual would be required to choose between receiving a vital, government provided social service and maintaining his right to freely exercise his religion.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1963); Guerricagoitia, supra
note 8, at 466 (arguing that charitable choice is coercive because it requires
individuals to shoulder the burden of requesting an alternative provider because of their own religious beliefs).
160. See H.R. 7 § 201(g) (stating only that if an individual objects to the religious character of the provider, an alternative provider will furnish assistance within a reasonable period of time); Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 456
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Finally, though the CCA implements numerous safeguards
to preserve its constitutionality, it still allows religious organizations to maintain their display of religious symbols in the areas where the organization provides the program. 161 It also expressly allows proselytization and instruction, so long as it
takes place outside the program. 162 In the absence of any definition, outside the program could mean a few feet outside the
entry door. All of these examples result in a direct burden on
an individual's religious practice. 163 The CCA is the proximate
cause of this burden; but for its focus on increasing the presence of religious organizations in the social service regime, only
non-profit, secular organizations would compete for and receive
funds to administer programs, reducing any objectionable
grounds for program beneficiaries. 164
The CCA also affects how religious organizations freely exercise their religious practices. The CCA prohibits the use of
funds for the support of religion or the religious practices and
beliefs of the organization. 165 Furthermore, the CCA directs
the organizations receiving the funds to conduct the programs
in a manner consistent with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 166 The CCA does not indicate how to achieve
that goal, but it seems reasonable to assume that the organization could not conduct the program in a religious manner. 167
(discussing situations where an individual's request for an alternative provider will not be honored or where there is no alternative readily available).
Some of the programs covered by the CCA provide what could be classified as
emergency services such as domestic violence situations, child abuse, and
crime victim situations. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(4)(A)(ii), (vi). Because the provision in
section 201(g) does not delineate clear guidelines, it is unclear what a recipient
could do in an emergency situation other than decide to set aside his own beliefs and accept the services of the religious provider. Id. § 201(g).
161. H.R. 7 § 201(d)(2)(B). This visual reminder of the religious character
of the organization would further burden an individual's religious beliefs or
lack thereof.
162. Id. § 201(j).
163. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
164. H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2). The CCA's purpose is to facilitate the entry of religious organizations into the social service regime. Id. Reading this purpose
into the anti-discrimination provision of section 201(c)(1)(B) creates a contradictory situation in which the CCA starts by focusing on religion, then requires those responsible for carrying out the goals of the CCA to ignore religion. Id. § 201(c)(1)(B); see also supra text accompanying notes 140-148.
165. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(2).
166. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A).
167. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818-19 (2000) (citing Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)) (emphasizing the
heightened Establishment Clause dangers when federal funds were distrib-
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Many of the existing private religious programs haled for
their effectiveness center their treatment of crime victims and
addicts on religion. 68 To receive funds under the CCA, these
religious organizations must change their approach to providing services to comply with the CCA's directions. 169 A clear alternative would be for those institutions to refrain from applying for federal funds. As discussed below, however, the
potential effect of this rationale is to create the appearance of
government endorsement of certain religions. 170 To compete on
an equal level with other religious organizations, the groups
would need to remove the religious character from the pro17 1
grams, thus constituting a burden.
Because the CCA makes explicit classifications on the basis
of religion and imposes a direct and substantial burden on inuted directly to religious schools).
168. See 147 Cong. Rec. H3452-53 (daily ed. June 21, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Souder) (discussing various existing faith-based treatment programs).
Many of these programs involve mandatory Bible study and church attendance as part of the program's regime. Id. These distinctly religious programs would not receive grants because the funds cannot be used in a manner
consistent with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See id. at
H3453-54.
169. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-11 (1988) (discussing the
questionable nature of direct aid to parochial schools because they were pervasively sectarian). This requirement stands in opposition to a protection included in the CCA. Religious organizations are to maintain their autonomy
from federal, state, and local governments, including the right to control "the
definition, development, practice, and expression of their religious beliefs."
H.R. 7 § 201(d)(1). Removing the religious aspects of the program requires the
modification of these ideals. See id. If these organizations did remove the religious emphasis of the program, it seems possible that those pervasive beliefs
would nonetheless surface in programs under the CCA.
170. See discussion infra Part III.B; cf Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810-11 (finding
that when religious institutions receive a financial benefit as a result of private choices, there is a reduced danger that the government will exhibit a
preference for certain aid recipients, which could create a program that favors
one religion over another).
171. To fulfill the goal of the CCA-increasing the presence of religious organizations in the social service regime-without creating an appearance of
endorsement, more than a few religions must apply for the funds. Cf H.R. 7 §
201(b)(2) (encouraging new providers to apply for funds). Many of these religious groups already provide programs with a distinctly religious basis. See
supra note 168 (noting the religious character of many programs). Therefore,
removing that religious foundation in order to comply with the CCA's directive
to implement programs in a manner consistent with the religion clauses constitutes an impermissible burden on that religious organization's ability to
freely exercise its religion. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (imposing strict scrutiny on classifications based on religion); see also H.R. 7 § 201(c)(1)(A).
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dividuals, strict scrutiny would be the appropriate level of re-

view. 72 The government is effectively dictating the exercise of
religion by requiring the removal of religion as a contingency to
receiving funds. 73 This surpasses any appropriate degree of
governmental intrusion into the free exercise of religion. 174
B. THE CCA WEAVES A TANGLED WEB: THE GOVERNMENT'S
ILLUSION OF "FREEDOM" ENSNARES RELIGION

The potential impact of the CCA and its constitutional
ramifications cannot be determined concisely or methodically
under the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 75 Although nothing prohibits Congress from using the
aid of religious organizations to fight secular problems, 176 the
Court views with suspicion government aid that flows directly
to religious organizations. 77 Under the CCA, administrators
grant funds directly to religious organizations that apply for social service program funding, thus giving the religious organi78
zation control over the funds.
First, although the CCA asserts a secular purpose, 179 the
clear sectarian purposes overwhelm the secular ones. 180 The
172. The purpose of the CCA explicitly targets religion and makes classifications on the basis of religion. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 n.3 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2). Therefore
the CCA is not a neutral law of general applicability that incidentally burdens
religious practices. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
173. See Dokupil, supra note 8, at 200.
174. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (noting that a burden on religion may withstand constitutional scrutiny where "[t]he state...
justiflies] a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest") (emphasis added).
175. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 804 (noting the confusion over the appropriate analysis for Establishment Clause claims).
176. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988).
177. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810, 818-19 (discussing the special dangers
inherent in direct government aid to religious groups).
178. Id. at 802-03 (emphasizing that the religious schools never received
direct authority over the funds or materials purchased by the funds).
179. See H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(b)(1) (2001) (including within the CCA's
purpose the effective and efficient delivery of social services to beneficiaries).
180. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (inquiring "vhether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion" as the
first part of an Establishment Clause analysis); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971) (describing the first prong of the Lemon test as whether the
statute has a secular purpose, which may involve an examination of legislative
intent); see also H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2)-(5) (stating that the CCA's purposes include
facilitating the entry of religious organizations into the social service regime,
prohibiting discrimination against religious organizations in the administra-
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CCA explicitly targets religious organizations and integrates
them into the federal system as administrators of federal programs. 18 1 The vast majority of the CCA is devoted to a discussion of the protection provided to religious organizations, 182 the
safeguards to bolster its constitutionality, 183 and the accountability of religious organizations.18 4 In fact, only two provisions
within the CCA address its secular purpose. 185 The debates in
the House of Representatives also indicate that the secular
purpose may represent merely a veil. 186 The CCA attempts to
dilute its religious policy by including gratuitous secular policies to establish a secular purpose. Although the government's
assertion is entitled to some deference, a court must "distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one." 187
The CCA's effect would also advance religion. l88 The CCA
contains an anti-discrimination provision regarding the allocation of funds. 189 Nonetheless, the express purpose of the CCAtion and distribution of those funds, allowing religious organizations to provide these programs without impairing their religious character or autonomy,
and protecting the religious freedom of the beneficiaries).
181. H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2).
182. See id. § 201(b)(3), (c)(1)(B), (d), (e).
183. See id. § 201(b)(5), (c)(1)(A), (c)(2)-(3), (j).
184. See id. § 201(i).
185. See id. § 201(g) (requiring that alternative providers be available for
individuals who object to the religious character of the organization); id. §
201(h)(1)-(2) (prohibiting discrimination by religious organizations against eligible program beneficiaries on the basis of religious beliefs); see also Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 464 (finding that since the PRWORA applied only to
religious organizations, the narrow statutory breadth denied an inference of a
secular purpose).
186. See 147 CONG. REC. H4102-03 (daily ed. July 17, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Edwards) (characterizing the CCA as a mechanism that directly funds
religion); id. at H3812-13 (daily ed. July 10, 2001) (statement of Rep. Edwards)
(pointing out President Bush's faith-based initiative "would for the first time
in our country's history, direct Federal tax dollars going immediately into the
coffers of our houses of worship... [and] would actually subsidize.., religious
discrimination"); id. at H3814-15 (statement of Rep. Souder) (reasoning that
so long as active proselytization is absent, there is no need for a complete
separation of church and state); id. at H3452-53 (daily ed. June 21, 2001)
(statement of Rep. Souder) (criticizing the emphasis of the CCA's opponents on
the separation of church and state because Americans are religious people);
see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (examining the legislative purposes and intent to determine the purpose of the statute).
187. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
188. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
189. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(1)(B).
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increasing the presence of religious organizations within the
social service regime-requires fund administrators to actively
seek out religious groups to effectuate that goal.190 The result
is that the CCA gives federal money to religious organizations
over nonprofit, secular organizations. 19 1 Furthermore, the majority of the CCA's provisions apply only to religious groups.192
Although the aid provided through the CCA is also available to
secular organizations, the majority of the protections offered by
the CCA apply solely to religious organizations. 193 Therefore,
the CCA fails to neutrally allocate funds to qualified organizations without regard to religion. 194
190. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(1)-(5) (listing the CCA's purposes). But see Bowen
v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 (1988) (stating that the AFLA did not require
that grantees have a religious affiliation).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 140-150 (finding that the CCA's
purpose and anti-discrimination provision help fulfill the statute's goal because only discrimination againstreligious organizations is prohibited). Compare Bowen, 487 U.S. at 608 ("[Nlothing on the face of the Act suggests it is
anything but neutral with respect to the grantee's status as a sectarian or
purely secular institution."), with Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 467 ("Charitable choice makes it easier for faith-based organizations to receive federal
funds not despite their religious character but because of that character.").
Early debates over the CCA suggested that for every religious group receiving
a grant, a secular counterpart would also receive a grant. See Taylor, supra
note 7, at 50-51. The CCA, however, does not include such a provision. It
seems unlikely that multiple groups will provide the same program in a given
area. Therefore, the religious organizations that receive funds will receive
them at the exclusion of secular groups. Although this may not hold true in
larger metropolitan areas, smaller cities and rural areas would surely see this
result. The exact application and effect of the CCA, however, is unclear. This
legislation represents a considerable expansion of the charitable choice concept first seen in PRWORA. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
192. See statutes cited supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text (listing
provisions of the CCA devoted to religion).
193. See H.R. 7 § 201 (applying the CCA's provisions, safeguards, protections, and restrictions to religious institutions). But see id. § 201(g)-(h) (including protections for program beneficiaries); Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at
471 (arguing that the PRWORA's charitable choice scheme is not a general
program with uniform requirements; it offers special treatment to religious
organizations on the basis of their religious character).
194. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (finding that aid flowing to a religious organization is constitutionally sound "if the government,
seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same
terms, without regard to religion")(emphasis added); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232
(upholding a federal program's constitutionality because the criteria for allocating aid did not favor or disfavor religion); see also Dokupil, supra note 8, at
198 (arguing that under PRWORA's charitable choice concept, it is impossible
to neutrally distribute funds among religious groups on an equal basis); Guerricagoitia, supra note 8, at 455-57 (discussing charitable choice in PRWORA
and the difficulty faced by government officials neutrally awarding funds to
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The CCA also neglects to include the principle of private
choice. 195 Religious organizations compete with secular groups
for federal funds to administer and distribute public programs. 196 These funds flow directly to the religious organization.197 Under this scheme, no private individuals make independent and genuine choices that direct aid towards religious
organizations.19 8 Instead, the federal aid reaches religious institutions by virtue of government decisionmaking. 199 Additionally, the CCA does not provide any criteria for determining
which organization should receive the funds, thus granting
broad discretionary authority to the officials in charge of
awarding the funds. This introduces the personal biases and
beliefs of those with decisionmaking authority2°°into the process,
resulting in advancement of certain religions.
The allocation scheme developed by the CCA defines aid
recipients with regard to religion. 20 1 It is unclear, however, if
202
this creates a financial incentive for religious indoctrination.
The federal grants offered under the CCA are not distributed to
secular and religious organizations on the same terms or without regard to religion. 20 3 The combination of the CCA's purpose
religious organizations for the provision of social services).
195. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225-26; H.R. 7 §
201(b)(3).
196. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(3).
197. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228-29 (concluding that the federal aid at issue did not flow directly to the religious schools because the funds did not
"reach [their] coffers" and went instead to a public agency); H.R. 7 §
201(i)(2)(A) (instructing religious organizations that receive federal funds to
segregate those funds into a separate account). Compare Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988) (finding that funds flowing directly to religious institutions do not present advancement problems unless those institutions are
pervasively sectarian), with 147 Cong. Rec. H3452, 3453 (daily ed. June 21,
2001) (statement of Rep. Souder) (describing the pervasively religious nature
of many existing faith-based programs that provide services without federal
funds).
198. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810;Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.

199. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
200. Cf Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (noting that the concept of private choice
eliminated the danger inherent in aid programs where the government exhibits preferences for recipients, which "could lead to a program inadvertently favoring one religion or favoring religious private schools in general over nonreligious ones").

201. See id., 530 U.S. at 813; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230.
202. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813;Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230.
203. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810, 814 (noting that when determining
whether the program defines its beneficiaries by reference to religion, the neutrality analysis is equally appropriate); see also H.R. 7, 107th Cong. §
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and its anti-discrimination provision results in the direct aid
2°4 It
allocation by officials that favors religious organizations.
is possible that religious organizations, as potential aid recipients, would modify their religious beliefs and practices to obtain federal grants. 20 5 If such incentive exists, the religious indoctrination at these programs would be attributable to the
206
government.
The excessive entanglement the CCA creates between religious organizations and the government represents the last
step in its advancement of religion. 20 7 The CCA provides a substantial benefit to institutions that are predominantly religious
in character.20 8 These institutions receive a financial benefit

201(c)(1)(B) (2001) (prohibiting discrimination against religious institutions
applying for grants); id. § 201(e) (allowing religious organizations to maintain
their exemption from Title VII and discriminate on the basis of religion); id. §
201(i)(3) (requiring a self-audit from religious organizations and allowing
them to correct any variances).
204. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (requiring that the federal aid be made
available on a nondiscriminatory basis to secular and religious groups to
eliminate the existence of the creation of a financial incentive); supra text accompanying notes 147-150 (arguing that the fund administrators must focus
on religious institutions in order to meet their double duty of furthering the
CCA's purpose and not discriminating against organization because it is religious).
205. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. Since many religious organizations currently offer programs rooted in religion, they would need to remove the emphasis on faith to administer a program consistent with the religion clauses
and comply with the CCA's ban on proselytization. See 147 Cong. Rec. H345253 (daily ed. June 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Souder) (describing such programs); see also H.R. 7 § 201(c)(1)(A), (j). Although there is no requirement
that religious institutions apply for grants, the purposes of the CCA require
many of those praised by Representative Souder to apply for aid and remove
the religious character from their programs. This is "required" to avoid a
situation where only a few religions control the aid. See also Dokupil, supra
note 8, at 200 (noting instances where grant recipients must alter their operations as a contingency of receiving the grant).
206. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814. The CCA allows religious organizations
to proselytize and offer sectarian worship and instruction when it is separate
from the program and voluntary on the part of the beneficiary. H.R. 7 § 201(j).
It also requires that the organizations be allowed to display religious symbols
and art. Id. § 201(d)(2)(B). Religious indoctrination offered "separate" from
the program can be interpreted as allowing such activity just outside the door
where other beneficiaries receive aid. See id. § 201(j). Although the indoctrination is voluntary on the part of the recipient, it is involuntary on the part of
the program beneficiaries still inside viewing religious symbols and art. See
id. § 201(d)(2)(B), (j).
207. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33.
208. See id. at 232.
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because of the CCA's express purpose and provisions. 209 The
relationship that will result between these organizations and
the government presents the persuasive argument that the
CCA creates an21excessive
entanglement and impermissibly ad0
vances religion.
The CCA allows religious organizations to deposit federal
funds directly into their coffers and then provide a variety of
vital and sensitive social service programs to the public-atlarge. 211 Despite the potential for constitutional violations by
the program providers and against the beneficiaries, the CCA
does not contain enforcement or compliance procedures. Instead, it includes numerous safeguards 212 that attempt to resolve present and future problems in one fell swoop.
Religious organizations that receive grants under the CCA
must implement the programs in a secular manner. 2 13 In reality, there is no way to enforce this provision. 214 A self-prepared
audit represents the only required record of the religious or2 15
ganization's activities under the federally funded program.
In addition, the CCA explicitly allows religious organizations to
proselytize and offer worship services and religious instruction
so long as participation is voluntary and outside the confines of

209. See id. at 233 (examining the nature of the aid for neutrality in determining excessive entanglement). The CCA's purpose and prohibition on
discrimination indicate a preference for religious institutions as social service
providers. See H.R. 7 § 201(b)(2), (c)(1)(B); discussion supra Part III.A.
210. SeeAgostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
211. See H.R. 7 § 201(c)(4), (i)(2)(A); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
212. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(2) (prohibiting the use of federal funds for religious
purposes); id. § 201(c)(3) (stating that the funds given to religious organizations do not constitute government endorsement of religion); id. § 201(c)(1)(A)
(requiring generally that the religious organizations implement programs in a
manner consistent with the religion clauses).
213. See id. § 201(c)(1)(A), (c)(2).
214. But see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) (finding that the
grantees' submission of a detailed proposal before receiving funds and, afier
receiving grants, the completion of evaluations and preparation reports on the
use of the funds, were adequate protections against the use of federal funds for
impermissible purposes). The CCA briefly pays lip service to the requirement
of compliance. After discussing the ban on the use of funds for proselytizing,
worship, and instruction, the CCA states that the organization will submit a
certificate to the disbursing agency saying it understands this provision. H.R.
7 § 201(j).
215. H.R. 7 § 201(i)(3); see also Dokupil, supra note 8, at 203 (noting that
many religious organizations will lack the resources and knowledge to comply
with the PRWORA's enforcement procedures and that the regulations may
threaten their autonomy, thus creating excessive entanglement).
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the program. 2 16 Therefore, sectarian instruction, worship, and
proselytizing could occur within a few feet of the program's entry. The lack of required accountability and the possibility of
religious inculcation necessitates some sort of statutorily required monitoring. 217
If the CCA wants to insure that organizations follow its instructions regarding the use of funds, the proper roles of the
government and the religious institutions, and the rights of
beneficiaries, it must necessarily require the government's
presence in religious organizations. The CCA states that the
religious organizations are to retain their autonomy and that
federal, state, and local governments cannot interfere with
their internal affairs. 218 Although many existing programs of2 19
fered by religious entities are extremely religious in nature,
the CCA merely states that religious organizations cannot use
the funds to further their religious beliefs, 220 that the programs
must be consistent with the religion clauses,2 2 1 and that they
cannot expend funds for sectarian instruction, worship, or
proselytizing. 222 Despite these directives, the CCA does not require that religious organizations remove religious art; in fact,
the CCA specifically states that religious organizations cannot
be required to remove these symbols.223
The CCA cannot maintain the separation it purports to
uphold when it does not monitor the organizations, evaluate
the programs for compliance, or test the quality of the aid provided.224 Although the CCA does not speak of the requirements
216. H.R. 7 § 201(j); see supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting § 201(i)).
217. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (finding a public supervisor's periodic inspections of the program at issue sufficient monitoring to
detect any religious inculcation). A monitoring system, on its own, will not
create excessive entanglement unless it is pervasive. See id.
218. H.R. 7 § 201(d)(2)(A)-(B).

219. See 147 Cong. Rec. H3452-53 (daily ed. June 21, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Souder).
220. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(2).
221. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A).
222. Id. § 201(j).
223. Compare Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1997) (including in

the list of the Court's reasons why no advancement resulted from the federal
program at issue the removal of religious symbols from the classroom before
remedial instruction was provided), with H.R. 7 § 201(e) (stating that federal,
state, and local governments cannot require religious organizations receiving
federal funds to remove religious symbols).
224. CompareAgostini, 521 U.S at 234 (listing as one of the Court's reasons
why no advancement resulted from the federal program the periodic, unan-
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faced by secular recipients, given the pains taken by Congress
to clearly list the limited responsibilities of the religious organizations, it seems reasonable to assume that secular organizations are subjected to more stringent requirements. For example, the CCA seemingly places religious organizations on the
same level as other organizations in terms of accounting responsibilities for the federal funds received. 225 The CCA, however, makes an exception for religious entities, requiring them
only to prepare a self-audit. 226 Therefore, non-religious organizations that receive the same funds will need to comply with
more stringent accounting practices to show the government
that they are correctly utilizing the funds.227
In addition to the safeguards, special provisions, and restrictions, the CCA allows religious organizations to discriminate in some employment practices, but not others. 228 The govnounced visits by a public inspector), with supra text accompanying notes 213216 (noting that in all of the CCA, only safeguards against government intrusion are present and not safeguards that the religious organizations are complying with the affirmative instructions of the CCA).
225. H.R. 7 § 201(i)(1).
226. Id. § 201(i)(3). In discussing the accountability of religious organizations, the CCA states that "a religious organization providing assistance under
any program [described in the statute] shall be subject to the same regulations
as other nongovernmental organizations to account in accord with generally
accepted accounting principles for the use of such funds and its performance of
such programs." Id. § 201(i)(1). Immediately preceding this assertion, however, the CCA makes exceptions to this general requirement insofar as section
201(i)(2)-(3) requires. Id. § 201(i)(1). The first of these exceptions provides
that religious organizations must segregate the federal funds into a separate
account, which would be subject to government audit. Id. § 201(i)(2)(A). The
second exception, however, states that those federal funds, which section
201(i)(2)(A) required to be placed in a separate account, will be subject to annual self-audit by the religious organization. Id. § 201(i)(3). The organization
then turns in a copy of that self-audit to the appropriate government agency.

Id.
227. The CCA initially states that religious and secular organizations are
subject to the same accounting practices. Id. § 201(i)(1). That statement is
qualified by two exceptions applying solely to religious organizations. See id. §
201(i)(1), (2)(A), (3). These exceptions allow religious organizations to simplify
their account procedures because the exceptions limit the funds to one account
and allow the organization to perform a self-audit. Id. § 201(i)(2)(A), (3). It
also follows that since the CCA includes a self-audit provision, the government, except perhaps in circumstances not listed, will not audit religious organizations. See id. Based on these exceptions and the accountability section
in general, it is reasonable to infer that secular organizations must comply
with either additional requirements, stricter guidelines, or both. See id.
228. See id. § 201(e)-(f) (allowing religious organizations to maintain their
exemption under Title VII regarding employment practices, but still requiring
compliance with other nondiscrimination statutes). For further discussion of
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ernment's involvement in religious organizations will be insured when beneficiaries or employees allege violations of antidiscrimination statutes. This reason and those above lead to
the plausible inference that by creating special exceptions and
requirements for religious organizations under the CCA, the
resulting relationship between these religious groups and the
government, as compared to non-religious groups, is one that
229
advances religion.
C. CONFLICT-FREE: EQUALITY TRIUMPHS OVER WHISPERED
OBJECTIONS

Religious employers receive an exemption from complying
230
with Title VII's ban on discrimination on the basis of religion.
The exemption applies only to hiring decisions of religious employers based on religious preferences. 23 1 Consequently, religious employers must still comply with the other discrimination
prohibitions
under
Title VII,
including
sex
discrimination. 232 Religious organizations receiving federal
funds for the administration of government programs under the
CCA are still entitled to exemption under Title VII.233 These
the problems presented by this dichotomy, see discussion infra Part III.D.
229. Cf Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 (discussing the criteria that lead to government advancement of religion); Dokupil, supra note 8, at 204 (discussing a
court's possible interpretation of the safeguards included in the PRWORA and
arguing that "the courts must not grant protections so expansive that government funding may sponsor proselytization or religious instruction").
230. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000); Rayburn
v. Gen. Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir.
1985) ("The statutory exemption applies to one particular reason for employment decision-that based upon religious preference.").
231. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166 (stating that the religious exemption in Title VII did not allow religious organizations to make hiring decisions on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin).
232. Freemont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1366. In Fremont Christian
School, the petitioner was a private, sectarian school. Id. at 1364. The school
required that its employees be evangelicals and adhere to its faith, which included the belief that only men are heads of households. Id. It offered health
insurance as a fringe benefit, which was available only to heads of household.
Id. The court found that Congress intended the religious exemption from Title
VII to be narrow in scope, noting that Congress and courts rejected the proposal to provide religious employers with a complete exemption from Title VII.
Id. at 1365-66. The court also rejected the school's claim that compliance with
Title VII prohibited the free exercise of its religion. Id. at 1368. The religion
at issue did not possess a rooted religious belief that it must discriminate
against women and minorities. Id.
233. H.R. 7 § 201(e).
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organizations, however, are not exempted from their duty to
comply with other federal anti-discrimination statutes. 234 Furthermore, there is no express preemption section in the CCA
235
that would resolve any potential conflict with state laws.
Congress did not evince any intent that would suggest it intended to regulate the insurance provision practices of religious
employers by enacting the CCA. 236 The issue here is whether
compliance with the CCA regulations for religious organizations renders compliance with the Women's Contraception Eq237
uity Act impossible.
States may enact their own laws to combat employment
discrimination. 238 California enacted the Woman's Contraception Equity Act as a remedial statute to address gender discrimination in insurance practices. 239 Many individuals receive
insurance through their employers; hence, the Act requires that
when the employer provides policies that offer prescription
drug coverage, those policies cover contraceptives. 240 Therefore,
the Woman's Contraception Equity Act resembles California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which provided
additional protections to pregnant female employees. 241 The
Supreme Court found it possible to comply with both Title VII
234. See id. § 201(e)-(f).
235. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81
(1987) (discussing the test used by the Court in determining preemption of
state law).
236. The Supreme Court found that Congress explicitly declined to categorically preempt state law in or occupy the field of employment discrimination law as it relates to Title VII and the PDA. Id. at 281. It follows that providing prescription drug coverage as a means of eliminating gender
discrimination is in the field of employment discrimination law because it is a
violation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), e-2(a) (2000); EEOC, supra
note 39.
237. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281 (quoting Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
238. See id. at 281 (finding that Congress did not intend to preempt state
law in or occupy the field of employment law).
239. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.196 (West Supp. 2002); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (not citable as precedent in any California court), rehkggranted, 31 P.3d
1271 (Cal. 2001); see also supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
240. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(a)(1) (West 2000); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10123.196(a)(1) (West Supp. 2002); Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 181, 182.
241. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 275-76 (addressing gender discriminatory employment practices on the basis of pregnancy by requiring reinstatement on a woman's return from her pregnancy).
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and FEHA, because both furthered the goal of the eradication
of gender discrimination in employment. 242 It logically follows
that employers can comply with Title VII and the Woman's
Contraceptive Equity Act because both laws further the goal of
243
eliminating gender discrimination.
Title VII does not preempt the Women's Contraception Equity Act even though both laws exist in the same field. 244 In
view of this finding, the CCA also would not preempt the
Women's Contraception Equity Act. The CCA operates in the
field of government-provided social service programs and the
effective delivery of those programs to the public.245 It does not
purport to affect the field of employment discrimination. It is
reasonable to infer that many employers and government social
service providers do not maintain a religious character. When
inquiring as to whether a federal law preempts a state law, the
objections of a clear minority to the application of the law do
not create a conflict between the laws that requires the preemption of the state law. 246 The vast majority of social service
providers and employers in California can comply with both the
Women's Contraception Equity Act and the CCA. Furthermore, for those religious employers that object to the Act, the
California legislature included an exemption to accommodate
247
their beliefs.
242. Id. at 290-9 1.
243. See id. at 288; Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (explaining
the policy rationale of the Women's Contraceptive Equity Act).
244. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 289, 292 (finding FEHA,
which provided additional protections for pregnant women, promoted equal
employment opportunity and was not preempted by Title VII). The Women's
Contraception Equity Act also promotes equal employment opportunity by
equalizing the insurance costs for men and women. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp.
2002).
245. See H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(b)(1)-(2) (2001).
246. The conflict that arises must render it impossible to comply with both
the federal and state law. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281
(quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)). Additionally, if the conflict so frustrates congressional purposes, creating an immovable obstacle, the state law is preempted. Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). To create such an "obstacle" resulting
in a conflict requiring preemption, logically vast complications in the application of such laws are necessary to require preemption. See id. That some religious employers would object to the application of the Women's Contraception
Equity Act is not enough to create an immovable obstacle or render compliance with each law impossible. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at
281; Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
247. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2000);
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D. A SMALL WORLD, A SHORT JOURNEY: CALIFORNIA CALLS
THE CCA's BLUFF
Even if the CCA could withstand constitutional scrutiny,
the EEOC's recent decision that included contraception within
the meaning of the PDA248 and its adoption within the federal
and state systems249 create problems for religious organizations, further revealing the problems inherent in the CCA.
Congress enacted the PDA to amend Title VII to further
promote equal treatment of women in employment by protecting pregnancy and pregnancy related conditions25 0 The EEOC
retains the charge of interpreting the scope and application of
the PDA, because the PDA is part of Title VII.25 1 The states
are encouraged to further the purpose of Title VIi-the elimination of workplace discrimination-by enacting their own
anti-discrimination provisions. 25a Title VI's express purpose is
to prohibit, among other things, discrimination on the basis of
sex.

25 3

A woman's decision to use contraception involves a conscious choice regarding pregnancy. Choosing not to use contraCAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2002) (laying out the religious employer exemption).
248. EEOC, supra note 39; see also Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
249. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275-76 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (finding the EEOC's interpretation of the PDA comported with
the congressional intent of Title VII); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 187-88 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (not citable as precedent in any California court) (adopting the
EEOC decision), reh'ggranted,31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001).
250. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2000),
amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000); EEOC, supra note 39; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
Congress enacted the PDA in order to abrogate a Supreme Court opinion that
held the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan did not constitute discrimination against women. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-78 (1983).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), e-4(g) (2000); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (stating that Congress charged the EEOC with enforcement responsibility under Title VII).
252. The Court in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra
found that Congress expressly rejected the notion of preempting state law in
the area of employment discrimination, as well as occupying that field. 479
U.S. 272, 281 (1987). Given this knowledge, one can infer, therefore, that
Congress did not occupy this field because it hoped that States would act individually to further Title VII's goals by enacting their own statutes, which, conceivably, could provide more protection and be more stringent. See id. at 285.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
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ception, in many cases, may indicate a desire to become pregnant, or, at least, makes a woman more susceptible to pregnancy. The PDA not only covers women who are actually preg254
nant, but also a woman's potential to become pregnant.
Furthermore, the PDA emphasizes that it covers not only
childbirth, but also related conditions. 255 Contraception (the
use or lack thereof) in large part determines whether or not a
woman will become pregnant. Therefore, if the PDA protects a
woman's potential to become pregnant, it logically follows that
contraception would be a "related condition" within the meaning of the PDA. 256 Given Congress's clear intent to eliminate
gender discrimination through Title VII, as amended by the
PDA, 257 the EEOC's interpretation of the PDA as prohibiting
the exclusion of contraceptives from prescription benefit plans
accords with Title VII and its legislative history. 258 Based on
this analysis, Catholic Charities and Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Co. appropriately adopted its reasoning.
The Women's Contraception Equity Act, a California law,
furthers the goals of Title VII and the PDA by working to
eliminate gender discrimination in insurance practices, a predominantly employer-provided item. 259 Many other states
share California's view and maintain substantially similar0
26
statutes that mandate prescription contraception coverage.
Although not all of these state statutes are identical to California's, courts could interpret many of them the same way California did in Catholic Charities-noexemption. 26 1 The religious

254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 199, 211 (1991).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199, 211.
256. EEOC, supra note 39.
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Cal. Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 285 (finding the PDA represents a floor, not a
ceiling); EEOC, supra note 39.
258. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (giving
substantial deference to EEOC interpretations that comply with the goals of
Title VII and its legislative history).
259.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000); CAL. INS.

10123.196 (West Supp. 2002).
260. For a list of the states that have such statutes, see supra note 47.
261. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 183-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (not citable as precedent in any California court), reh'g granted, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal.
2001); supra note 47 (showing that although some states maintain religious
employer exemptions, many statutes are ambiguous because they contain no
definition of a religious employer).
CODE §
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organizations will serve people of all faiths and be federal fund
recipients, two factors which, on their face, remove some of the
"religion" from a religious employer. This factor raises significant concerns for religious organizations that receive funds under the CCA.
The CCA gives government money directly to religious or26 2
ganizations to administer federal social service programs.
These organizations could administer a variety of diverse and
potentially complicated programs. 263 To ensure effective delivery of these programs, religious organizations would likely need
a staff. For example, the CCA allows religious organizations to
provide programs that assist students in obtaining their diplomas and GEDs. 264 An efficient program of this nature requires
teachers and a support staff. Accordingly, under many of these
programs, religious organizations would become employers.
Religious employers only receive an exemption from compliance
with Title VII with regard to hiring decisions. 265 Therefore,
these newly created religious employers would need
to comply
266
with Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.
The EEOC's decision makes excluding contraceptives from
prescription drug benefit plans a violation of federal law. 267 To
comply with Title VII, religious employers like Catholic Charities that do not fall into an exemption and that provide insurance plans to employees would need to provide contraceptive
coverage. 268
This result affects religious organizations
throughout California and the rest of the nation. Though not
all religious organizations object to contraception as strenuously as the Catholic Church does, 26 9 it seems likely that many
262. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(b)(2) (2001).
263. For a list of the areas in which the CCA provides that religious organizations can administer programs, see supra note 28.
264. H.R. 7 § 201(c)(4)(B)(i).
265. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994),
amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1994); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (9th Cir.
1986); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166 (4th Cir. 1985); H.R. 7 § 201(e).
266. See Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1366; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at
1166-67.
267.

EEOC, supra note 39.

268. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (not citable as
precedent in any California court), rehg granted,31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001).
269. See id. at 183 (explaining that the exemption included in the Women's
Contraception Equity Act arose out of the complaints of the Catholic Church
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may not be comfortable with the notion of the requirement to
comply with federal anti-discrimination statutes.27 0 Additionally, this requirement represents an example of the government potentially interfering with the free exercise of religious
practices. 271
Although the logical response to this concern is that religious organizations should not accept federal money under the
CCA, this would make it difficult to meet the CCA's goalincreasing the presence of religious organizations in the existing social service regime. 272 In addition, the religious organizations that do not object to these requirements would control the
funds and the available pool of providers, creating problems for
that providing contraception was the facilitation of a sin).
270. For example, the Court addressed a freedom of association claim under the First Amendment in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648
(2000). The Court examined the issue of whether the application of New Jersey's public accommodation law, which would require the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to include Dale, a gay Scout leader, as a member, violated the First
Amendment right of freedom of association. Id. at 647-48. The Court cautioned that government actions could burden this freedom, giving as a specific
example, the intrusion of a regulation upon the internal affairs of an organization. Id. at 648 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984)). The Court's concern centered on a regulation that forced a private
group like the BSA to include a member that caused it to send an unwanted
message and compromised the expression of its views. Id. The Court found
that the BSA engaged in expressive activity, thus triggering the First
Amendment right to freedom of association. Id. at 648-50. Furthermore, forcing the BSA to accept Dale as a member would significantly compromise its
expression. Id. at 656. Because of this substantial burden, the interest of
eliminating discrimination embodied in New Jersey's public accommodation
law was not sufficient to justify the intrusion on the BSA's right to freedom of
association. Id. at 657, 659. Considering the Court's reasoning and conclusion
in Dale, which found that a public accommodation law enacted to prevent discrimination could not outweigh the interests of a private organization like the
BSA, it seems that the CCA's requirement that religious employers comply
with many federal anti-discrimination laws would create a conflict for those
religions that object to the individuals or ideas protected by the statutes. See
id.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1963) (finding that a government regulation that forced an individual to choose between her religious beliefs and work represented an impermissible burden); supra note 32 (listing
the federal anti-discrimination statues religious organizations must comply
with under the CCA). Although these religious organizations would not be
considered "private" because they are recipients of federal grants, they can
still invoke the protections of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The conflict caused by the organizations' compliance could result in the Court
pitting the exercise of groups' religious beliefs against the interests of the government in enacting anti-discrimination statutes.
271. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (declaring that
Congress may not pass laws that punish on account of religious beliefs).
272. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(b)(2) (2001).
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individuals seeking services. 273 Finally, in the absence of a diverse array of religious groups, the fund administration system
set up through the CCA could result in a small number of religions using the majority of the funds, creating an appearance of
government endorsement of certain religions at the exclusion of
others. 274
CONCLUSION
The unknown consequences of the CCA represent its gravest dangers. If the CCA becomes law, the government, religious organizations, and individuals will face a myriad of potential difficulties. On one hand, the CCA seeks to provide
individuals with the opportunity to choose a religious provider
of government services. On the other hand, to maintain its
constitutionality, the CCA orders these organizations to administer the programs secularly. The CCA first asserts a rationale
of faith to support the "choice" it offers and then removes the
very faith it hopes to promote.
The inability of a religious organization to separate entirely its beliefs from its very existence ensures, however, that
faith will be present in the programs the CCA funds. In a very
limited respect, therefore, the CCA maintains its faith rationale, but at a high cost. The choice given to individuals who
seek faith is taken away from those who do not. The inherently
religious nature of the organization and its display of religious
imagery create a kind of assault on individuals who hold different beliefs and those who choose not to believe at all.
In addition to its burden on individual religious choices,
the CCA places religious organizations in a quandary. The
choice the CCA gives to these groups erodes the freedom it purports to preserve. Religious organizations that receive federal
funds lose their right to infuse the program with their religious
tenets. Those organizations that continue to promote religious
values forego the opportunity for the increased exposure that
accompanies these grants.
The special treatment provided to religion under the CCA
further complicates the predicament. The CCA searches for religious organizations, promising them numerous protections
273. See discussion supra Part III.A.
274. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843-44 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asking whether a reasonable observer would perceive the aid as government endorsement of religion).
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and autonomy. The CCA's promises, however, create constitutional problems instead of affording constitutional protections.
The CCA compromises the independence it aimed to preserve
by entangling government objectives with religious pursuits.
The CCA's authors hoped the safeguards would establish a
safe haven for religion. Instead, they construct a cage. Religious organizations must now comply with a host of laws at
varying levels of government. A court's decision to require
Catholic Charities to provide contraception represents but one
example of the difficulties religious organizations will face if
they receive direct federal aid.
The existing social service system presents the government
with a dire situation. It must determine the best way to deliver
effectively vital services to its citizens. The CCA is not the solution. The controversy it presents and its difficult application
will only serve to remove the focus and resources from the root
of the problem-fixing the ineffective delivery of social services.
Religious organizations will continue to provide effective programs for needy individuals. The Constitution, however, drew
a line to separate these organizations from the state. Although
the line between church and state is not absolute, it has existed
in varying strengths throughout our nation's history. Charitable choice, on paper, blurs that line. In practice, it would obliterate it.

